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REPROCESSING VERMONT YANKEE

Jack Beermann*
Gary Lawson**

When federal agencies conduct informal rulemaking proceedings – rulemakings
that are not required by organic statutes to use formal, trial-type procedures – the text of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) 1 imposes very few procedural constraints on
the agencies. According to the plain terms of Section 553 of the APA, 2 an informal
rulemaking requires only a relatively sparse notice of proposed rulemaking that contains
“the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved,” 3 an “opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation,” 4 and
“a concise general statement of the[] basis and purpose” 5 of any rules adopted. Even
these seemingly minimal notice-and-comment (as they are generally called) procedural
* Professor, Boston University School of Law.
** Professor, Boston University School of Law. I am grateful to the Abraham and Lillian Benton Fund for
support.
1

60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at scattered sections of Title V of the United States Code).

2

Technically, the reference should be to “section 4 of the APA, which is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 553,” but
we follow the standard convention which refers to APA sections by their codification in the United States
Code rather than by their section numbers in the original enacted bill.

3

The notice must also contain “(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings” and “(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed.” 5 U.S.C. § 553
(b). Nothing in (1) requires that there actually be public rulemaking proceedings; it merely requires the
agency to give notice of them if the agency chooses to provide them.

4

Id. (emphasis added).

5

Id. § 553(c).

requirements do not apply to “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice,” 6 rules which the agency has “good
cause” to issue without notice-and-comment procedures,7 or rules that concern “a
military or foreign affairs function . . . or . . . agency management or personnel or . . .
public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts” 8 – the latter exception encompassing
the overwhelming bulk of the federal budget. In modern times, the occasions for formal,
trial-type rulemaking are rare to nonexistent, 9 so virtually all federal rulemaking is
subject to this stark statutory framework—supplemented, of course, by procedures
mandated on a case-by-case basis by other statutes, agency regulations, or constitutional
law.
Beginning in the late 1960s, however, judges on the D.C. Circuit – with
considerable support from the surrounding political and academic communities – decided
that the procedures for informal rulemaking provided by the Administrative Procedure
Act were inadequate to allow effective legal control of agencies that were widely
perceived as vulnerable to industry capture. 10 Accordingly, in the 1960s and 1970s, the

6

Id. § 553(b)(A).

7

Id. § 553(b)(B).

8

See id. § 553(a).

9

The APA mandates use of trial-type procedures in rulemakings only when organic statutes require rules
to be “made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” Id. § 553(c). See id. §§ 556-57
(extensively describing the procedures required when organic statutes call for hearings “on the record’). In
United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973), the Supreme Court effectively held that unless
organic statutes specifically state that rules must be made “on the record,” those statutes will be construed
to require only the APA’s informal notice-and-comment procedures. As of this moment in time, in the
more than 30 years since Florida East Coast Railway, no organic rulemaking statute that does not contain
the specific words “on the record” has ever been held to require formal rulemaking. The case may well
have been wrongly decided, but that is a story for another day.

10

For background on these developments, see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 19671983, 72 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 1039 (1997); Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and

2

lower federal courts essentially re-wrote the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking
provisions to require extensive procedural machinery, including: elaborate notices of
proposed rulemaking that disclose to the public all relevant evidence possessed by the
agency; 11 the use of oral proceedings, cross-examination, and/or discovery when deemed
appropriate by the court; 12 comprehensive statements of basis and purpose that respond
in technical detail to all important points raised by outside parties during the
rulemaking; 13 and prohibitions on ex parte agency contacts with outside parties, 14 agency
predetermination of important issues, 15 and substantial deviations between final rules and
proposed rules. 16 The courts also cut back substantially on the scope of the statutory
exemptions from APA rulemaking procedures, most notably the exemption for
“interpretative rules.” 17
For roughly a decade, the Supreme Court watched these developments (if it
watched them at all) with apparent disinterest. In 1978, however, the Court spoke loudly
and carried a huge club. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 18 the Court
unanimously and stridently chastised the D.C. Circuit for forcing the Nuclear Regulatory

the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1975).
11

See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

12

See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

13

See, e.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

14

See, e.g., HBO, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 51-59 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

15

See, e.g., Association of Nat’l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

16

See, e.g., Connecticut Light & Power, Inc. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

17

See, e.g., Pickus v. U.S. Board of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

18

435 U.S. 519 (1978).

3

Commission to employ procedures such as discovery and cross-examination in a noticeand-comment rulemaking when no organic statute, regulation, or constitutional provision
required it. In sweeping terms, the Court declared that the D.C. Circuit had “seriously
misread or misapplied . . . statutory and decisional law cautioning reviewing courts
against engrafting their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with
substantive functions by Congress” 19 and warned the lower court that it “should . . . not
stray beyond the judicial province . . . to impose upon the agency its own notion of which
procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good.” 20
Vermont Yankee is almost universally regarded as one of the most important
administrative law decisions issued by the Supreme Court. And with respect to the issue
squarely decided by the Court, the case has had a major doctrinal impact: federal courts
today do not feel free to require agencies to use oral hearings and cross-examination in
informal rulemakings or adjudications 21 without grounding in positive law.
For the past three decades, various scholars have been anticipating, and urging, a
“Vermont Yankee II,” in which the Court would similarly invalidate other administrative
law doctrines claimed to be unlawful and/or unwise. Shortly after the Vermont Yankee
decision, Paul Verkuil was “Waiting for Vermont Yankee II” to put an end to rigorous
substantive judicial review of agency policy decisions, which he thought raised
essentially the same problems of law and policy as did the procedural doctrines rejected

19

Id. at 525.

20

Id. at 549.

21

This principle has logically been extended to informal adjudications as well. See Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. LTV, 496 U.S. 633, 653-55 (1990).

4

by the Court in Vermont Yankee. 22 Professor Verkuil has thus far been sorely
disappointed: the Court has validated so-called “hard look” substantive review, 23 which
continues to this day unabated. More recently, Richard Pierce announced that he too was
“Waiting for Vermont Yankee II,” this time to overturn the First Circuit’s long-standing
presumption that language in organic statutes calling for a “hearing” in agency
adjudications triggers the APA’s formal, trial-type adjudicatory procedures. 24 Professor
Pierce lost the battle but won the war: the First Circuit has recently abandoned this
presumption of adjudicatory formality 25 – not because of any perceived inconsistency
with the Vermont Yankee decision but because of a perceived inconsistency with the
Chevron doctrine, 26 which requires courts to defer to reasonable agency constructions of
statutes administered by the agencies. 27
At the risk of meeting much the same fate as Verkuil, Pierce, Estragon, and
Vladimir, we want to join the line of those waiting for a Vermont Yankee II. But we have
in mind very different targets than did Professors Verkuil and Pierce. These prior calls
for a Vermont Yankee II were not actually attempts to extend the reasoning and holding

22

Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 55 Tul. L.
Rev. 418 (1981).
23

See Motor Vehicle Mftrs Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
24

Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 669 (2005). The First Circuit
announced this presumption of adjudicatory formality more or less contemporaneously with the Vermont
Yankee decision. See Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978).

25

See Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2006).

26

See id. at 16-18.

27

See 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For treatments of the development and mechanics of the Chevron doctrine,
see Ronald A. Cass, Colin S. Diver & Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials
124-159 (5th ed. 2006); Gary Lawson, Federal Administrative Law --- (4th ed. 2007).
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of Vermont Yankee. Rather, Professors Verkuil and Pierce were using Vermont Yankee
as a broad symbol – a metaphor of sorts -- for Supreme Court intervention to reign in
undue lower-court interference with agency discretion and autonomy. The reasoning and
holding of Vermont Yankee, as interpreted according to conventional norms of case
analysis, do not go nearly that far. Hard look review and a presumption of adjudicatory
formality may or may not be bad ideas, but they are not strictly inconsistent with Vermont
Yankee. There are, however, a significant number of important administrative law
doctrines that do seem to fly squarely in the face of all but the most unreasonably narrow
understandings of the Vermont Yankee decision. These doctrines, ranging from the
prohibitions on agency ex parte contacts and prejudgment in rulemakings to the expanded
modern conception of the notice of proposed rulemaking, are all ripe for reconsideration.
In Part I of this article, we revisit Vermont Yankee to identify its proper scope.
The decision can be read in at least three different ways: broadly to require strict fidelity
to the text of the APA in all respects, narrowly to forbid only the very specific practices
rejected in the case, or naturally (so we claim) to forbid imposition of any administrative
procedures not firmly grounded in some source of positive statutory, regulatory, or
constitutional law. Armed with the “natural” reading of Vermont Yankee, in Part II we
briefly explore the proposals of Professors Verkuil and Pierce for a Vermont Yankee II
and show that neither proposal actually flows, or even purports to flow, from Vermont
Yankee, though both proposals can be defended on other grounds. In Part III, we identify
a range of administrative law doctrines that seem to us to be either in tension or flatly
inconsistent with the natural understanding of Vermont Yankee. Some of those doctrines,
such as the prohibition on ex parte contacts or agency pre-judgment in informal

6

rulemakings, could be discarded at little or no cost, while the rejection of others, such as
the modern requirements concerning notices of proposed rulemaking and statements of
basis and purpose, would send shock waves throughout the administrative law system.
Part IV briefly concludes.

I

A brief review of the Vermont Yankee decision is necessary in order to pin down
its proper scope. 28 In 1954, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act 29 in order to
promote and channel the commercial use of nuclear power. 30 Under the statute, nuclear
power plants must be licensed in order to be built or operated 31 ; these licensing
proceedings are adjudications under the APA and require a “hearing.” 32 In addition, the

28

For more detailed background on the case, see Gillian E. Metzger, The Story of Vermont Yankee: A
Cautionary Tale of Judicial Review and Nuclear Waste, in Administrative Law Stories 124 (Peter L.
Strauss, ed. 2006). The Vermont Yankee decision actually consolidated two appeals from decisions of the
D.C. Circuit. The second case – Consumers Power Co. v. Aeschliman, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1976) –
primarily concerned substantive rather than procedural issues and will not be discussed here.
29

68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended at scattered sections of Title 42 of the United States Code).

30

See 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2000).

31

For the first 35 years of the statute, separate licensing proceedings had to be held for construction and
operation of nuclear reactors. In 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by rule created a streamlined
procedure for obtaining a “combined” construction/operation license (and also for obtaining approval of
site locations and generic reactor designs ). See Early Site Permits; Standard Design Certifications; and
Combined Licenses for Nuclear Power Reactors, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,372 (codified at C.F.R. pts. 2, 50-52 &
170). For an overview of the streamlined procedures, see Neal H. Lewis, Interpreting the Oracle:
Licensing Modifications, Economics, Safety, Politics, and the Future of Nuclear Power in the United
States, 16 Alb. LJ. Sci. & Tech. 27 (2005-06).
32

42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). The degree of procedural formality required by these hearings has been a
matter of ongoing controversy. For a recent, if inconclusive, skirmish, see Citizens Awareness Network,
Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004).
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission 33 ) has
general authority to “make, promulgate, issue, rescind and amend such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Chapter.” 34 This grant
of general rulemaking authority neither specifies any procedures for such rulemakings
nor requires the rules to be made “on the record,” and it therefore authorizes informal,
notice-and-comment rulemaking under the APA.
On December 2, 1966, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation applied for a
license to construct and operate a nuclear power plant in Vernon, Vermont. More than a
year later, the construction license was granted. 35 The request for an operating license
was the subject of a hearing on August 10, 1971, at which the then-Atomic Energy
Commission ruled that it would not consider the environmental effects of the
reprocessing or disposal of nuclear wastes generated by the plant (though it would
consider the environmental effects of transporting the fuel to storage or disposal sites).
This decision was affirmed by the agency’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal
Board. 36
Shortly thereafter, the agency issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to consider
a rule “that would specifically deal with the question of consideration of environmental
effects associated with the uranium fuel cycle in the individual cost-benefit analyses for

33

In 1974, the Atomic Energy Commission was abolished, see 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (2000), and its regulatory
functions were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See id. § 5841.
34

Id. § 2201p.

35

See In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), 4 A.E.C. 36
(1967).
36

See In re Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), 4 A.E.C.
930 (1972); In re Vermont Yankee Corp., 5 A.E.C. 297 (1972).

8

light water cooled nuclear power reactors.” 37 As part of the rulemaking, the
Commission’s staff prepared an “Environmental Survey of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle,”
dated November 6, 1972, which foresaw few if any environmental problems from nuclear
waste reprocessing or disposal. 38 Perhaps owing to the obvious controversy surrounding
nuclear waste, the Commission’s proposal contained two alternatives to be used in all
reactor licensing proceedings, one that specified very small values for the environmental
effects of fuel reprocessing and disposal and another that specified that fuel reprocessing
and disposal would not be taken into account at all, on the theory that the waste from no
single power plant contributed measurably to any environmental problem. 39 The
Commission expressly stated that the rulemaking proceeding would be “informal” and
“legislative-type” 40 with no cross-examination or discovery. Although the text of the
APA requires only that the public be given an opportunity to make written submissions,
the Commission held a public hearing, inviting interested persons to “attend the hearing
and present oral or written statements.” 41 The Commission also made available for
inspection the staff-generated Environmental Survey of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, 42
although the text of section 553 of the APA says nothing about public availability of

37

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Environmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 37 Fed. Reg.
24,191, 24,191 (Nov. 15, 1972).
38

See id. at 24,192.

39

See id. at 24,193.

40

Id.

41

Id. (emphasis added).

42

See id. (“Copies of . . . [the survey] may be examined at the Commission’s Public Document Room . . .
[or] may be obtained upon request”).

9

agency documents in rulemakings. 43 The Commission ultimately adopted a rule that
specified small values for the environmental effects of reprocessing and disposal of spent
nuclear fuel. 44

A. The D.C. Circuit Speaks

The rule was successfully challenged in the D.C. Circuit by the National
Resources Defense Council and other environmental lobbying groups. 45 The challenge,
and the vast bulk of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, focused on the scanty substantive support
for the agency’s action: the Environmental Survey that formed the basis for the agency’s
rule was long on conclusions but remarkably short on detail. 46 The petitioning
environmental groups, however, also objected to the absence of cross-examination and
discovery, which they argued was necessary in order to reveal the basis for the agency’s
Environmental Survey. And thereby hangs our tale.
Although the text of the APA seems to provide no support for any such
procedural claims in an informal notice-and-comment rulemaking, the petitioners had a
strong claim by the standards of mid-1970s D.C. Circuit caselaw. Starting with

43

The Freedom of Information Act, which is technically part of the APA, requires agencies to make
rulemaking documents publicly available unless the requested information comes within one of nine stated
exceptions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(3)(A), 552(b) (2000). But that requirement is independent of any
rulemaking proceeding, and our focus is on requirements imposed by Section 553.
44

See Enironmental Effects of the Uranium Fuel Cycle, 39 Fed. Reg. 14,188 (1974).

45

See NRDC Inc. v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

46

See id. at 646-53. The agency did a much better job of supporting its decision on its second try. See
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).

10

Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd 47 in 1968, which suggested in dictum that
the “concise general statement of . . . basis and purpose” required by Section 553(c)
needed to be considerably less concise and general than anyone had previously
supposed, 48 the D.C. Circuit issued a series of decisions that reshaped the informal
rulemaking process. The court made it very clear that in order for the agency to show
that it had fully “ventilated” the issues, 49 had taken a “hard look” at the problems before
it, 50 and was not a “seed bed for the weed of industry domination,” 51 procedures beyond
those specified in statutes, regulations, or due process might be necessary. According to
the D.C. Circuit, notices of proposed rulemaking needed to disclose and make available
important documents that underlay the agency’s proposed actions, 52 and the rulemakings
might need to be conducted with a substantial measure of procedural formality. As the
court explained in 1974, “basic considerations of fairness may dictate procedural
requirements not specified by Congress. Oral submissions may be required even in
legislative-type proceedings, and cross-examination may be necessary if critical issues
cannot be otherwise resolved.” 53
47

407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

48

See id at 338 (“[I]t is appropriate for us . . . to caution against an overly literal reading of the statutory
terms ‘concise’ and ‘general.’ These adjectives must be accommodated to the realities of judicial scrutiny,
which do not contemplate that the court itself will, by a laborious examination of the record, formulate in
the first instance the significant issues faced by the agency and articulate the rationale for their
resolution.”).

49

The need for “ventilation” of issues was one of the D.C. Circuit’s most consistent themes. See Scalia,
supra note --, at 355 n.55.
50

Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

51

Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

52

See Portland Cement Ass’n v.Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

53

O’Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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Against this backdrop, it was not surprising that the “primary argument advanced
by the public interest intervenors . . . [in Vermont Yankee was] that the decision to
preclude ‘discovery or cross-examination’ denied them a meaningful opportunity to
participate in the proceedings,” 54 that the government in Vermont Yankee conceded that
circumstances sometimes “require additional procedures in ‘legislative-type
proceedings,’” 55 or that the D.C. Circuit in Vermont Yankee expressed serious doubts
about the adequacy of the agency’s procedures as well as the adequacy of its evidentiary
support:
Many procedural devices for creating a genuine dialogue on these issues
[of waste reprocessing and disposal] were available to the agency – including
informal conferences between intervenors and staff, document discovery,
interrogatories, technical advisory committees comprised of outside experts with
differing perspectives, limited cross-examination, funding independent research
by intervenors, detailed annotation of technical reports, surveys of existing
literature, memoranda explaining methodology. We do presume to intrude on the
agency’s province by dictating to it which, if any, of these devices it must adopt
to flesh out the record. It may be that no combination of the procedures
mentioned above will prove adequate, and the agency will be required to develop
new procedures. . . . On the other hand, the procedures the agency adopted in this
case, if administered in a more sensitive, deliberate manner, might suffice.
Whatever techniques the Commission adopts, before it promulgates a rule
limiting further consideration of waste disposal and reprocessing issues, it must in
one way or another generate a record in which the factual issues are fully
developed. 56
54

547 F.2d at 643.

55

Id. The petitioners’ claims and the government’s concession in Vermont Yankee were explicitly framed
in terms of “due process,” id. at 643, but the line of cases that led to Vermont Yankee had long gone well
beyond constitutional requirements. There could, of course, be rulemakings that are so particularized in
their impact that they must be considered adjudications for purposes of the Constitution and therefore
require whatever procedures are necessary to conform to due process. That has been clear at least since
1908. See Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
359 F.2d 624 (D.C. Cir. 1966). But the D.C. Circuit’s caselaw from 1968 through Vermont Yankee
routinely required procedures in general rulemakings to which constitutional due process requirements
plainly did not apply. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239 U.S.
441 (1915). “Due process,” in other words, was often used – and was clearly used by all parties in Vermont
Yankee -- as shorthand for appropriate procedures in a generic sense rather than as a term of constitutional
law.
56

547 F.2d at 653-54.
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The D.C. Circuit’s discussion exposes a fundamental ambiguity concerning the
values that the lower courts were pursuing when they required procedures in addition to
those specified in the APA and other governing statutes. Was the concern procedural,
that the bare bones of § 553 did not create a “genuine dialogue” sufficient to satisfy
notions of procedural fairness as applied to the complex and important matters involved
in the Vermont Yankee rulemaking? Or was it that the “factual issues [were not] fully
developed” and thus the agency’s conclusion, without a better record, was substantively
inadequate under APA § 706? As we shall see, this ambiguity provided just the opening
the Supreme Court needed to weigh in on the propriety of courts imposing their
procedural views on agencies and on the connection between procedure and substance in
administrative law.

B. The Supreme Court Speaks – Very, Very Loudly

The Supreme Court decision was the legal equivalent of a meltdown for the D.C.
Circuit and the NRDC. After setting out the fundamental character of the APA and the
stark terms of Section 553, the Court said that its prior decisions in United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp. 57 and United States v. Florida East Coast R. Co. 58 “held
that generally speaking this section of the Act established the maximum procedural
requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in

57

406 U.S. 742 (1972).

58

410 U.S. 224 (1973).
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conducting rulemaking procedures.” 59 The Court added that it had “for more than four
decades emphasized that the formulation of procedures was basically to be left within the
discretion of the agencies” 60 and that “[a]bsent constitutional constraints or extremely
compelling circumstances the ‘administrative agencies “should be free to fashion their
own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to
discharge their multitudinous duties.” ’ ” 61
The Court swatted down the NRDC’s claim, which in 1978 had overwhelming
support in lower-court case law, that section 553 “merely establishes lower procedural
bounds and that a court may routinely require more than the minimum when an agency’s
proposed rule addresses complex or technical factual issues or ‘Issues of Great Public
Import,’ ” 62 finding that it had no support in the statute, its legislative history, or prior
Supreme Court decisions. To the contrary, said the Court, there is “little doubt that
Congress intended that the discretion of the agencies and not that of the courts be
exercised in determining when extra procedural devices should be employed.” 63

59

435 U.S. at 524. In fact, Allegheny-Ludlum and Florida East Coast R. said no such thing. They held
only (and wrongly) that the requirement in the Esch Car Service Act of 1917, 24 Stat. 379 (codified at 49
U.S.C. § 11122 (2000), that rules respecting rates for railroad car rentals be set “after hearing” did not
trigger formal rulemaking under § 553(c) of the APA. But for the present story, the Court’s understanding
of these cases in Vermont Yankee is more important than the cases themselves.
60

435 U.S. at 524.

61

435 U.S. at 543 (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965), in turn quoting FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 143 (1940)). The “extremely compelling circumstances” mentioned by
the Court were quite clearly cases in which “a totally unjustified departure from well-settled agency
procedures of long standing might require judicial correction.” 435 U.S. at 542. This makes excellent
sense: if an agency has a long practice of discretionarily granting procedures and then suddenly denies
them to a party that is similarly situated to past parties that received those procedures, the agency must at
least explain the differential treatment under the arbitrary or capricious standard of section 706(2)(A) of the
APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) (instructing courts to overturn agency decisions that are “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
62

Id. at 545.

63

Id. at 546.
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The Court also identified “compelling reasons for construing [section 553] in this
manner.” 64 If courts “continually review agency proceedings to determine whether the
agency employed procedures which were, in the court’s opinion, perfectly tailored,” 65
and if they conduct such procedural reviews after the rulemaking is over in a kind of
“Monday morning quarterbacking,” 66 the agencies would feel pressure to use extensive
procedures in every rulemaking to avoid the threat of reversal. “Not only would this
totally disrupt the statutory scheme . . . , but all the inherent advantages of informal
rulemaking would be totally lost.” 67 Furthermore – and, in the Court’s judgment,
“perhaps most importantly” 68 -The court below uncritically assumed that additional procedures will
automatically result in a more adequate record because it will give interested
parties more of an opportunity to participate in and contribute to the proceedings.
But informal rulemaking need not be based solely on the transcript of a hearing
before an agency. . . . Thus, the adequacy of the “record” in this type of
proceeding is not correlated directly to the type of procedural devices employed,
but rather turns on whether the agency has followed the statutory mandate of the
Administrative Procedure Act or other relevant statutes. If the agency is
compelled to support the rule . . . with the type of record produced only after a full
adjudicatory hearing, it simply will have no choice but to conduct a full
adjudicatory hearing prior to promulgating every rule. . . . [T]his sort of
unwarranted judicial examination of perceived procedural shortcomings of a
rulemaking proceeding can do nothing but seriously interfere with that process
prescribed by Congress. 69

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 547.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 547-48.
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“In short,” concluded the Court, “nothing in the APA, NEPA [the National
Environmental Policy Act], the circumstances of this case, the nature of the issues being
considered, past agency practice, or the statutory mandate under which the Commission
operates permitted the court to review and overturn the rulemaking proceeding on the
basis of the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the Commission so long
as the Commission employed at least the statutory minima, a matter about which there is
no doubt in this case.” 70

C. So What Did They Say?

Reading precedent is an art rather than a science. A case’s holding can always be
narrowed to its most specific facts (“do not reverse 1974 NRC rulemakings concerning
the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle because of the absence of discovery
and cross-examination”) or broadly generalized (“never go beyond the narrowest possible
interpretation of a statute”). Nonetheless, there are operational norms in the American
legal system that place some readings of a case out of bounds and make some plausible
readings better than others. There are at least three plausible readings of Vermont
Yankee, and one of those readings seems pretty clearly to be the most plausible.
The broadest plausible reading of Vermont Yankee would take it as call to read the
APA according to its original understanding in 1946. 71 There is much language in the
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Id. at 548.
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The APA has been amended in a few respects, mostly concerning sovereign immunity and the FOIA,
but its basic provisions governing agency procedures and judicial review have been essentially unchanged
since their enactment.
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opinion to support this reading. The opinion begins with a paean to the original statute:
“In 1946, Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act, which . . . was not only ‘a
new, basic and comprehensive regulation of procedures in many agencies,’ but was also a
legislative enactment which settled ‘long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and
enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.’ ” 72
The Court repeatedly emphasized the consistency of its interpretations of the APA over
40 years, 73 and the decision is full of references to the intentions and purposes of the
enacting Congress. 74 As then-Professor Scalia noted, by the early 1970s, “it became
obvious even to the obtuse . . . that the Supreme Court regarded the APA as a sort of
superstatute, or subconstitution, in the field of administrative process: a basic framework
that was not lightly to be supplanted or embellished . . . . ” 75 The Vermont Yankee
decision was obviously unhappy with the lower courts’ meddling with the purity of the
Act.
On the other hand, the Court’s wrath was directed specifically to the lower courts’
addition of procedures not required by some positive source of law. There are many
provisions in the APA that do not concern agency procedures. Sections 701-06, for
instance, concern the availability, timing, scope, and consequences of judicial review.
There was good reason to think in 1978 – and there continues to be good reason to think
today – that many of these provisions had been construed in a fashion quite different
from their original understanding in 1946. Section 702, for instance, declares that “[a]
72

435 U.S. at 523 (quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950)).
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Scalia, supra note --, at 363.
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person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved
by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.” 76 This provision pretty obviously codified the common-law rules for standing
in 1946: parties could challenge agency action if they were directly harmed by agency
action in a manner traditionally recognized as cognizable by the courts or were
authorized to sue by a specific statute expanding the range of acceptable plaintiffs beyond
this core. 77 In 1970, however, the Supreme Court had construed this statute to impose a
drastically different, far more inclusive standing regime than would have been
contemplated in 1946. 78 It is doubtful that the Court in Vermont Yankee meant to call
this doctrine into question, and it is therefore doubtful that the Court meant to call for a
categorical return to the 1946 understanding of the APA. Similarly, section 706(2)(A)’s
instruction to courts to hold unlawful agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” 79 was probably intended in
1946 to reflect something like the “rational basis” test in post-1937 substantive due
process law. 80 By 1978, courts were routinely engaging in far more vigorous review of
the substance of agency decisionmaking. It is hard to imagine that the Court in Vermont
Yankee meant to pass judgment on this practice. Indeed, when the Court in Vermont
Yankee sent the case back to the D.C. Circuit to consider whether the agency’s rule was
76

5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
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See Cass, Diver & Beermann, supra note --, at 270-71; Lawson, supra note --, at --.
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substantively justified, the only injunction was that the lower court should not “stray
beyond the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon the
agency its own notion of which procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some
vague, undefined public good.” 81 There was no mention of the proper standard for
substantive review. 82
A second, and better, reading of Vermont Yankee would thus understand it as a
call for a return to the original meaning of the APA specifically with respect to agency
procedures. This reading is built on the voluminous language in Vermont Yankee
stressing both the fundamental character of the APA as settling, once and for all, the
legally-required procedures agencies must follow, and the importance, to both the
framers of the APA and to the Vermont Yankee Court, of leaving agencies with discretion
to fashion procedures in the absence of specific dictates in positive law. It appears to be
the reading endorsed by the Court itself in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV:
“Vermont Yankee stands for the general proposition that courts are not free to impose
upon agencies specific procedural requirements that have no basis in the APA.” 83
Indeed, this reading of the opinion is so straightforward that we call it the “natural”
reading.
Strictly speaking, of course, this “natural” reading extends somewhat beyond the
issues squarely presented by the facts of Vermont Yankee. The Court was not called upon
to assess a wide range of judicial interpretations of the APA’s procedural provisions; it
81

435 U.S. at 549 (emphasis added).
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Indeed, the lack of attention to substantive standards of review was precisely Professor Verkuil’s
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was called upon only to pass upon the specific practice of requiring agencies to employ
procedures such as cross-examination and discovery during informal rulemakings. There
are many procedural provisions of the APA that are not directly implicated by this
practice. Agencies engaged in legislative rulemaking must issue notices of proposed
rulemaking and (if they adopt rules) statements of basis and purpose; the legal
requirements for these documents were not strictly at issue in Vermont Yankee. Agencies
conducting rulemakings must decide to what extent they can engage in ex parte contacts,
reach conclusions on certain issues before the rulemaking commences, or determine that
rules will be interpretative rather than legislative. All of these matters are, in some
important sense, procedural, and none was squarely presented in Vermont Yankee.
Accordingly, a third, narrower reading of Vermont Yankee would take it to forbid courts
from requiring agencies to use specific procedures during a rulemaking, after the notice
of proposed rulemaking has been published, without specific legal authorization in a
statute, regulation, constitutional provision, or (perhaps) long-standing agency practice.
This third reading is in fact essentially the interpretation of Vermont Yankee that
has prevailed since 1978. We are aware of only one procedural doctrine other than the
requirement of procedures not grounded in positive law during an informal agency
proceeding that has been held to be inconsistent with Vermont Yankee: shortly after the
Vermont Yankee decision was issued, the lower courts abandoned their practice of
deeming substantive rather than interpretative any rules that had a “substantial impact” on
the behavior of regulated parties. 84
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See Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Many courts continue to deem substantive
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One reason why this third reading of Vermont Yankee has prevailed is that the
Vermont Yankee Court did not comment explicitly on the interpretive method courts
should apply to the APA and other statutes that impose procedural requirements on
agencies. It did provide some hints, however, in its discussion of the principles and
policies underlying its rejection of the lower courts’ tendencies to increase procedural
formality according to their own notions of policy or fairness. First, the basic principle of
Vermont Yankee is that Congress and the agencies, and not the federal courts, should
decide the appropriate level of procedure for agencies. Second, the Court announced
strong policies against unpredictability and overproceduralization. The Court stated that
if courts were allowed to ratchet up the level of procedure whenever they though fairness
or policy would be served, “judicial review would be totally unpredictable [a]nd the
agencies . . . would undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance.”
A final principle underlying Vermont Yankee is that courts conducting substantive
judicial review should not expect informal procedures to produce the sort of record that is
likely to be produced only through formal procedures.
A faithful reading of Vermont Yankee thus points to two principles and to two
policies in the interpretation of procedural provisions governing agencies. 85 On
principle, courts should not add to those procedures clearly required by statute either to
create a “better” record or because the courts find increased procedure desirable. As to
policy, first, the agencies should be able to predict, in advance, the level of procedure
required. This means that courts should rely only on explicit provisions of the APA and
other applicable statutes and rules and they should read those provisions narrowly,

85

See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 155-56 (2006).
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without embellishments that would be difficult to predict. Second, courts should preserve
agencies’ ability to employ informal procedures where the APA and other statutes and
rules allow. Courts should resist the temptation to evaluate all agency proceedings
through the normative lens of adjudication.
Thus, despite its seemingly widespread acceptance, this third reading of Vermont
Yankee, under which courts are free to elaborate on the APA the way they apply the Due
Process Clause to impose all sorts of non-textually supportable requirements, is unduly
narrow. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Vermont Yankee, and refused to dismiss
the writ, because it wanted to make some fairly significant statements about
administrative law. Indeed, the Court went quite a bit out of its way to take and hold the
case. 86 Its decision was plainly grounded in a view of the APA’s procedural framework
as a fundamental charter that courts should not unilaterally alter. The reason for the
Court’s decision – both for the specific outcome and for the fact that the case was decided
in the first place – was less the particular requirements of cross-examination and
discovery in informal proceedings imposed by the D.C. Circuit than the general principle
86

Given the usual norms for the Supreme Court’s discretionary docket, the D.C. Circuit’s Vermont Yankee
decision should never have been reviewed. First, and most obviously, the lower court decision seemed to
be primarily about the evidentiary basis for the agency’s decision. Surely the Supreme Court was not going
to grant certiorari to review a fact-bound determination concerning an agency’s evidentiary support for a
conclusion, even if the judicial determination was clearly wrong (and the lower court decision in Vermont
Yankee was very far from clearly wrong in this respect). The Solicitor General – over the objection of the
agency – opposed the grant of certiorari on precisely this basis. See Metzger, supra note --, at 152.
Second, the ambiguity in the lower court’s decision on whether the agency’s error was substantive or
procedural counseled against a grant of certiorari. Third, once certiorari had been granted, the agency
adopted a new interim rule to deal with the environmental consequences of the nuclear fuel cycle and made
clear that it was well on its way to adopting a new permanent rule. See 435 U.S. at 535 n.14. While this
may not have, as the NRDC vigorously urged, rendered the case technically moot and therefore beyond the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it certainly made it odd for the Supreme Court to spend time and docket
space on a soon-to-be-defunct agency rule. In explaining its refusal to dismiss the writ, the Court wrote
that the D.C. Circuit’s imposition of rulemaking procedures without statutory, regulatory, or constitutional
basis “raises questions of such significance in this area of the law as to warrant our granting certiorari and
deciding the case” notwithstanding the imminent demise of the rule at issue. Id. at 537 n.14. It was very
clear that the Court thought that it had something important to say about administrative law.
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embraced by the lower courts that judges could add to the procedures otherwise laid
down in positive law. Because the Vermont Yankee Court was apparently motivated by
norms favoring predictability, informality and flexibility together with its reliance on the
original meaning of the APA, the decision should be taken both as a clear rule that courts
may not impose procedural requirements on agencies not grounded in the text of the APA
or some other applicable statute and as a general injunction to construe the APA’s
procedural provisions according to their original plain terms. This is, for want of a better
phrase, the natural reading of Vermont Yankee.

II

Because the language in Vermont Yankee is so strong and the tone of the opinion
is so harsh, it is very tempting to try to find new applications for whatever principles one
can draw from it. Two such attempts to extend Vermont Yankee, by Richard Pierce and
Paul Verkuil, are especially notable. While the positions urged by these authors are
defensible on many grounds, we do not believe that either attempt is – or purports to be –
a defensible application of the most plausible reading of Vermont Yankee.

A. Does a Presumption of Formal Adjudication Violate Vermont Yankee?

The APA mandates the use of formal trial-type proceedings for both rulemakings
and adjudications that are “required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity

23

for an agency hearing.” 87 The Supreme Court held in two cases in 1972 and 1973 that
rulemaking statutes that call for a “hearing,” without a specification that the hearing be
“on the record,” do not require formal proceedings. 88 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court
has not spoken directly on when an adjudication statute requires formal adjudication. In
1978, in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 89 the First Circuit reasoned that
adjudications are more likely than rulemakings to involve particularized fact-finding that
lends itself well to quasi-judicial procedures, 90 and the court accordingly was “willing to
presume that, unless a statute otherwise specifies, an adjudicatory hearing subject to
judicial review must be on the record.” 91 Some courts have agreed with the First
Circuit’s presumption of adjudicatory formality.92 Other courts have treated adjudicatory
statutes much like rulemaking statutes by presuming that the absence of “on the record”
language in adjudicatory statutes means that informal proceedings were permissible. 93 In
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1989, the D.C. Circuit added a new wrinkle to this split in authority by holding that if the
language of an organic adjudicatory statute is ambiguous, as will generally be true of
language calling for an adjudicatory “hearing” without a specification that it be “on the
record,” courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of those statutes 94 under
Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC. 95
In 2005, Professor Richard Pierce urged the Court to issue a “Vermont Yankee II”
to overturn the First Circuit’s presumption of adjudicatory formality. 96 According to
Professor Pierce, the Seacoast doctrine “has precisely the same adverse effects as the
practice the Supreme Court held unlawful in Vermont Yankee” 97 by straight-jacketing
agencies into employing full trial-type procedures in every adjudication. This is
somewhat of an overstatement by Professor Pierce. The First Circuit’s presumption does
not suffer from the same level of unpredictability as the pre-Vermont Yankee practice in
the lower courts regarding rulemaking. The pre-Vermont Yankee practice involved a
relatively unguided exercise of judicial discretion over how much procedure to require.
By contrast, the First Circuit’s presumption is a relatively clear and thus highly
predictable rule pointing toward formal procedures in all cases in which an adjudicatory
hearing is required.
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Further, Professor Pierce overlooks the aspect of Vermont Yankee that the Court
deemed “perhaps” most important, the linkage between the sufficiency of the record and
the procedures employed. The Supreme Court admonished the D.C. Circuit not to
require a record that could only be produced by formal procedures because that would
mean that agencies would have no choice but to employ formal procedures in order for
their rules to survive substantive review. By contrast, the Seacoast doctrine does not link
the level of procedure to the sufficiency of the record on review, but appears to be based
purely on the First Circuit’s view of the procedural entitlements created by the applicable
statutes.
Professor Pierce again overstates his case when he states that the legal support for
the First Circuit’s presumption in favor of formal procedures is as weak as the legal
support for the pre-Vermont Yankee practice in the lower courts. As the Supreme Court’s
analysis revealed, the pre-Vermont Yankee lower courts had no legal support for their
practice of requiring more procedures other than their perception that, due to the
importance or complexity of the rulemaking, more procedure would be fairer or create a
better record in support of the rules adopted. There was no statute that could plausibly
be read as supporting the pre-Vermont Yankee practice. The First Circuit, by contrast,
has a plausible reading of the statutes involved on its side, buttressed in some cases by
legislative history and prior agency practice.
Professor Pierce is correct, however, that the First Circuit’s presumption is in
tension with the Vermont Yankee Court’s apparent preference for agency flexibility and
informality. The Seacost doctrine gives agencies a strong incentive to use formal
procedures, perhaps even stronger than did the pre-Vermont Yankee practice with regard
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to rulemaking. In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court overstated its case when it said
that judicial power to impose whatever procedures seemed appropriate after the
rulemaking meant that in all cases agencies “would undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory
procedures.” In fact, even before Vermont Yankee, many agencies used less than full
adjudicatory procedures in rulemakings even though they were probably aware that there
was a chance that a reviewing court would find the procedures employed inadequate.
However, the Court’s concern was legitimate that, absent unconstitutionality, courts
should not force agencies to employ procedures Congress did not intend to require.
Professor Pierce is thus correct that the First Circuit’s presumption likely caused
overproceduralization whenever the word “hearing” appeared in a statute when Congress
may not have intended formal procedures.
The question really boils down to whether the Seacost doctrine is a correct
understanding of Congress’s use of the word “hearing” in numerous adjudication statutes.
Here, Professor Pierce argues forcefully that while the doctrine might have been
“defensible until the Supreme Court issued its 1984 opinion in Chevron,” 98 in the postChevron era, any presumptions of adjudicatory formality or informality in the absence of
clear statutory specification of procedures must give way to a presumption in favor of the
agencies’ reasonable constructions of their organic statutes. 99
It is clear that Professor Pierce is not really arguing that the Seacoast doctrine is
strictly inconsistent with Vermont Yankee. The key decision for Professor Pierce is
Chevron: he agrees with the D.C. Circuit in Chemical Waste Mgmt. that Chevron
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compels deference to the agency’s choice of procedural formats when the organic statute
is ambiguous about the kind of adjudicatory “hearing” that is required. His real
complaint is not that the First Circuit ignored Vermont Yankee but that it ignored
Chevron. He is using Vermont Yankee essentially as a metaphor for reigning in unruly
lower courts that are overproceduralizing administrative law rather than arguing directly
from precedent.
Of course, if Professor Pierce is correct, then courts that adhere to the Seacoast
presumption when agencies construe the relevant statute differently are, in essence,
imposing procedures not mandated by statute, which is precisely the practice against
which Vermont Yankee warned. But the same can be said about every instance in which
an agency misinterprets a procedural provision of a statute or constitution. One does not
need Vermont Yankee in order to tell courts not to misinterpret the law, nor can Vermont
Yankee plausibly be read as a general injunction against judicial error concerning agency
procedure. Vermont Yankee was targeted at judicial imposition of procedures simply
because judges decided that they were a good idea. Accordingly, in our view, procedural
mistakes violate Vermont Yankee when they are not based on an honest reading of some
source of positive law. We recognize that honest but clearly wrong procedural rulings
may create many of the practical problems noted by Vermont Yankee. In some cases,
they may represent subtle but stubborn judicial refusal to obey Vermont Yankee. But
unless they abandon plausible readings of positive legal materials to impose procedures,
they do not violate Vermont Yankee as we understand it.
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Professor Pierce may or may not be right about the applicability of Chevron to
agency adjudicatory statutes, 100 and he accordingly may or may not be right about the
merits of the Seacoast doctrine, but nothing about this debate implicates the principles of
Vermont Yankee.
Shortly after Professor Pierce’s article was published, the First Circuit, in
apparent agreement with the D.C. Circuit, adopted precisely the position that he urged,
holding that Chevron requires deference to reasonable agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes containing hearing requirements for adjudications. 101 The court did
not mention Vermont Yankee; its decision to reject (or limit) Seacoast turned solely on
the view that a new Supreme Court opinion applying Chevron 102 required it to
“reexamine pre-Chevron precedents through a Chevron lens.” 103 Professor Pierce thus
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got his “Chevron II” (albeit from a lower court) rather than his “Vermont Yankee II” -which we suspect is what he really wanted all along. 104

B. Does Hard-Look Review Violate Vermont Yankee?

Section 706(2)(A) of the APA instructs reviewing courts to set aside agency
action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 105 In the absence of a more specific directive in the APA, an organic statute,
or caselaw, this provision provides a general standard of review applicable to all agency
action that is subject to judicial review.
Since the late 1960s, courts concerned about industry capture of administrative
agencies have used this provision to require agencies in rulemakings explicitly to
articulate all of the key issues of fact, law, and policy raised in the proceedings, to spell
out the steps in the agency’s reasoning process in considerable detail, to address the
major concerns raised by commenting parties during the rulemaking, and generally to
show the court and the public that the agency has “really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient
problems, and has . . . genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.” 106 Review
under this “hard-look” doctrine is generally quite rigorous and imposes a substantial
burden on both agencies and courts.
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Criticisms of this relatively intrusive form of substantive judicial review
abound. 107 In 1981, Paul Verkuil expressed disappointment that the Supreme Court had
not used Vermont Yankee as a vehicle to clarify the appropriate scope of judicial review,
and he urged a Vermont Yankee II that would add to the Court’s procedural decision “a
substantive one, modifying the expansive scope of review standard that allows reviewing
courts to build a record in informal proceedings. If the Court fails to add a second
decision to Vermont Yankee, it will have done very little to establish the primacy of
agency control over the rulemaking process.” 108
Professor Verkuil expressly was not claiming that Vermont Yankee by itself, as a
doctrinal matter, called into question the validity of hard-look review. To the contrary,
he thought that a sequel to Vermont Yankee was necessary in order to restore to agencies
some of the discretion that, in his judgment, the lower courts had wrongly taken away
during the 1968-78 expansion of the scope of substantive judicial review. 109 For
Professor Verkuil, a Vermont Yankee II would not be an application or extension of
principles already contained in the original Vermont Yankee decision but instead a
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decision comparable in scope and tone to Vermont Yankee aimed at a quite different
target.
Nonetheless, there clearly can be some tension between Vermont Yankee,
understood purely as a decision about procedures, and modern hard-look review. If
courts use the need for careful substantive review as an excuse to force agencies to
employ certain procedures in order to build a record (by saying, for example, that any
record that does not subject certain information to discovery and cross-examination is by
virtue of that fact substantively inadequate to support an agency decision), hard-look
review can provide a vehicle for doing an end-run around Vermont Yankee’s direct
prohibition on judicial creation of procedures without grounding in positive law. If
agencies cannot create a record that would survive substantive review while employing
the informal procedures specified in the APA, then they will have no choice but to
increase the level of procedure. There are obviously distinct echoes here of the Vermont
Yankee Court’s concern with increased procedures in the name of creating a better
substantive record in support of agency rules.
But while hard look review may or may not be a correct or even plausible
interpretation of section 706(2)(A) – a point on which the authors are not necessarily in
full agreement -- we are not convinced that hard look review violates Vermont Yankee.
Hard look review does not necessarily force agencies to adopt any specific procedures.
As the Court recognized in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV, 110 hard look review
“imposes a general ‘procedural’ requirement of sorts by mandating that an agency take
whatever steps it needs to provide an explanation that will enable the court to evaluate the
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agency’s rationale at the time of decision,” 111 but as long as the agency rather than the
court gets to determine how best to satisfy that substantive obligation, Vermont Yankee is
not necessarily implicated. Hard look review is not unpredictable, it does not deny to
agencies the flexibility Congress intended, and if courts apply hard look review in a
manner that is sensitive to the Vermont Yankee problem, agencies will not be pushed into
procedures not mandated by law. Vermont Yankee and hard look review can peacefully
co-exist.

III

If the essential holding of Vermont Yankee is that courts should not impose
procedural requirements on federal agencies without at least an arguable grounding in
positive law, there is a wide range of contemporary doctrines that are likely, and in some
cases clear, violations of this principle. A true Vermont Yankee II would reconsider some
of these doctrines.

A. Ex Parte Contacts in Informal Rulemaking

Perhaps the clearest example of a doctrine that flouts Vermont Yankee is the
judicial prohibition on ex parte communication with or by an agency during informal
rulemakings. The APA defines an ex parte communication as “an oral or written
communication not on the public record with respect to which reasonable prior notice to
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all parties is not given, but it shall not include requests for status reports on any matter or
proceeding not covered by this subchapter.” 112 In formal rulemakings or adjudications –
that is, proceedings that are required by organic statutes to be conducted “on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing” – section 557 of the APA contains extensive and
detailed prohibitions on ex parte contacts between “any interested person outside the
agency” and any agency personnel who “may reasonably be expected to be involved in
the decisional process of the proceeding.” 113 The provision effectively requires any
relevant communication regarding a matter before the agency in a formal proceeding to
be placed in the public record, which section 556 in turn establishes as the exclusive basis
for a proper agency decision in such proceedings. 114 By stark contrast, the APA contains
no prohibition on ex parte communications in informal proceedings.
Nonetheless, for nearly half a century, the D.C. Circuit has sought to limit ex
parte contacts in at least some informal rulemakings. In 1959, the court, egged on by the
Department of Justice, found that ex parte contacts in an FCC rulemaking to assign
television channels violated “basic fairness [which] requires such a proceeding to be
carried on in the open,” 115 and the court ordered the proceeding reopened. Nearly two
decades later, in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 116 the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed and
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extended this doctrine. 117 The court worried “that the final shape of the rules we are
reviewing here may have been by compromise among the contending industry forces,
rather than by exercise of the independent discretion in the public interest the
Communications Act vests in individual commissioners.” 118 From this, the court
observed that “[e]ven the possibility that there is one administrative record for the public
and this court and another for the Commission and those ‘in the know’ is intolerable. . . .
[T]he public record must reflect what representations were made to an agency so that the
relevant information supporting or refuting those representations may be brought to the
attention of the reviewing courts.” 119 While recognizing that “informal contacts between
agencies and the public are the ‘bread and butter’ of the process of administration and are
completely appropriate so long as they do not frustrate judicial review or raise serious
concerns of fairness,” 120 the court held that “once a notice of proposed rulemaking has
been issued . . . any agency official or employee who is or may reasonably be expected to
be involved in the decisional process . . . should ‘refus[e] to discuss matters relating to
the disposition of a [rulemaking proceeding] with any interested private party . . ..’ ” 121
The court went on to require that if ex parte contacts occur, any documents involved or
written summaries of any oral communications received should be placed on the public
rulemaking record. 122 This regime is very difficult to distinguish from the careful
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regulation of ex parte contacts in formal rulemakings and adjudications specified by the
APA in section 557.
In subsequent years, the D.C. Circuit has effectively limited its judicially-created
prohibition on ex parte contacts to informal rulemakings that have some of the look and
feel of adjudications – that is, that resolve conflicting claims among identifiable
claimants rather than establish general policy. 123 The court has not applied the doctrine
to contacts with Congress and the President. 124 The court has even held, citing Vermont
Yankee, that ex parte contacts cannot be judicially forbidden in informal adjudications in
the absence of statutory, regulatory, or constitutional authority:
Although the APA prohibits ex parte contacts in an adjudication or
rulemaking “required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing,” there is no such requirement applicable to the MarAd’s review
of an application under § 9. In the absence of such a statutory command, of
course, “[a]gencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of
their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the
agencies have not chosen to grant them.” Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978). Here the agency has not granted anyone the
right to be free of ex parte communication. 125
This would seem a fortiori to rule out any judicially-imposed prohibition in informal
rulemakings. Indeed, one set of commentators has said that the Home Box Office
doctrine “has been construed narrowly by subsequent courts to the point of virtual
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obsolescence as a judicial precedent.” 126 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit has never
expressly disavowed the doctrine, and it continues to be the subject of active academic
commentary. 127
There is no plausible basis in the APA for prohibiting ex parte contacts during
informal proceedings. To the contrary, the carefully delineated prohibitions on such
contacts in formal proceedings, coupled with the absence of any remotely comparable
provisions for informal proceedings, renders any such claim frivolous. Organic statutes
or agency regulations could, of course, forbid or limit ex parte contacts in rulemakings in
specific cases, but the D.C. Circuit’s doctrine purports to be general law rather than
something peculiar to FCC statutes or regulations. Nor can one ground the doctrine in
the requirements of substantive review, as Home Box Office seemed to suggest. This
would be precisely the sort of use of substantive review to require specific agency
procedures that Vermont Yankee forbids. Vermont Yankee firmly rejected the notion that
a court may require additional procedures to ensure an adequate record, stating that “the
adequacy of the ‘record’ in this type of proceeding is not correlated directly to the type of
procedural devices employed, but rather turns on whether the agency has followed the
statutory mandate of the Administrative Procedure Act or other relevant statutes.” 128
This means that courts should not use standards of substantive review to add to the
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specific requirements contained in the procedural provisions of the APA or other sources
of positive law.
To be sure, one can imagine certain instances in which procedural due process
might, as a matter of constitutional law, restrict ex parte contacts in rulemakings.
Normally, the procedural due process protections we associate with adjudicatory hearings
do not apply to agency rulemakings, no more than they apply to actions of legislators;
that has been the understood import of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of
Equalization of Colorado 129 for nearly a century. Vermont Yankee acknowledged that
“even in a rule-making proceeding[,] when an agency is making a ‘ “quasi-judicial” ’
determination by which a very small number of persons are ‘ “exceptionally affected, in
each case upon individual grounds,” ’ in some circumstances additional procedures may
be required in order to afford the aggrieved individuals due process.” 130 Thus, there can
be proceedings that are statutorily defined as rulemakings but that count as adjudications
for purposes of constitutional due process. 131 Consider, for example, a ratemaking
proceeding that is automatically defined as rulemaking by the APA 132 but that only sets a
rate for one firm’s shipment of one product to one customer on one occasion. Regardless
of how the APA defines that action for statutory purposes, it is quite conceivable (though
perhaps not inevitable) that the Constitution would regard it as specific enough to fall
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within due process protections, and it is also quite conceivable (though also perhaps not
inevitable) that due process in those circumstances might forbid or limit ex parte
contacts. 133
If the D.C. Circuit’s prohibition on ex parte contacts in informal rulemakings was
grounded in procedural due process, it would not violate Vermont Yankee. But despite
the decisions narrowing the doctrine to rulemakings involving relatively specific
claims, 134 nothing suggests that the D.C. Circuit means to limit its doctrine only to those
rulemakings that actually count as adjudications for constitutional purposes. There is no
way, for example, that the rulemaking proceeding in Home Box Office, which involved
broad regulation of cable and subscription television programming, could conceivably
fall on the “adjudication” rather than “rulemaking” side for constitutional purposes.
Judicial limitations on ex parte contacts in informal rulemakings, which
effectively require agencies to place such contacts on some kind of public record, are
precisely the sorts of procedural interventions against which Vermont Yankee warned,
and not only because the addition of procedures not clearly specified by statute is
involved. The rule against ex parte communications violates Vermont Yankee’s
underlying policies. First, it is highly unpredictable. The D.C. Circuit cannot seem to
agree on whether it applies all the time, or only to competing claims to a valuable
privilege or some such thing. Second, because it is unpredictable, it tends toward
overproceduralization under which no agency rulemaking is safe unless the agency
133
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enforces a ban on ex parte contacts. Third, it links the sufficiency of the record to the
procedures employed when it expresses the concern that there will be a secret record,
available only to those privy to the ex parte communications that occurred. Finally, it
violates the fundamental principle underlying Vermont Yankee, that courts have no
business imposing statutes not clearly required by law. Unless the limitations on ex parte
contacts can find some grounding in due process or specific organic statutes or
regulations, they are a flagrant violation of the principles and holding of Vermont Yankee.

C. Agency Bias and Prejudgment of Issues

One of the most basic principles of adjudication is that the adjudicator is supposed
to be unbiased and have an open mind. A proceeding in which the judge is biased or has
pre-judged the issues violates procedural due process. 135 The same constitutional
principles apply to administrative adjudication. 136 In addition, section 556 of the APA
specifically provides that in formal proceedings “[o]n the filing in good faith of a timely
and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or other disqualification of a presiding or
participating employee, the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record and
decision of the case.” 137 On prejudgment, it is grounds for disqualification of an
administrative adjudicator if he or she “has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as
the law of a particular case in advance of hearing it.” 138
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Legislative prejudgment is unlikely to violate the Constitution, the APA or any
other applicable statute. There is no constitutional requirement that legislators have an
open mind. Quite to the contrary, legislators are often elected precisely because the
voters believe that they are unalterably close-minded on at least some important
questions. Open-mindedness in legislators shades very easily into waffling or flipflopping, which are neither always expected nor desired qualities. When agencies make
rules, they behave more like legislators than like judges. Unless the rulemaking is so
particularized that it crosses the constitutional line into adjudication, 139 procedural due
process does not require open-mindedness in administrative rulemaking. Nor does the
APA require open-mindedness in informal rulemaking; there is no provision for
disqualification of agency decisionmakers for prejudgment in section 553.
The D.C. Circuit has nonetheless said, in a decision that post-dates Vermont
Yankee, that administrative rulemakers must recuse themselves “when there has been a
clear and convincing showing that the Department member has an unalterably closed
mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding.” 140 Although this standard
is meant to be more lenient than the standard that applies to administrative adjudicators
(or agency personnel in formal rulemakings), it is unclear where courts get the authority
to impose recusal requirements at all in informal rulemakings. That authority does not
come from the APA. 141 Nor does it come from the Constitution if we are talking about
rulemakings that are sufficiently general to fall under Bi-Metallic (which is almost all
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real-world rulemakings). If there is no requirement of open-mindedness in organic
statutes or agency regulations, the judicial creation of such a requirement seems to be
precisely the sort of procedural invention forbidden by Vermont Yankee.
The only possible statutory basis for a requirement of open-mindedness in APA
informal rulemaking is the specification that “after considering the relevant matter
presented” the agency must include a “concise general statement” of the basis and
purpose of any rules adopted. 142 While this provision strikes us as focused more on the
establishment of the concise general statement requirement, it implies that the agency
should consider the comments received. An administrator with a closed mind, it can be
argued, does not actually consider comments contrary to her position, except perhaps as
an inconvenience along the way to implementing her position. This, however, is the sort
of indirect reasoning that Vermont Yankee should be understood to reject as contrary to
its principle and policies. As a matter of principle, courts should not prescribe a standard
for prejudgment disqualification where Congress has not spoken. As a matter of policy,
this sort of reasoning is likely to render the APA highly unpredictable and encourage
overproceduralization.
The rule requiring open-mindedness is not, it should be noted, a serious violation
of Vermont Yankee because it is less open-ended than the general pre-Vermont Yankee
practice of fine-tuning procedure to each rulemaking. Further, the “unalterably closed
mind” standard is so difficult to prove that it is highly unlikely that any violation will
ever be found. 143 However, it suffers from a somewhat unrelated flaw that underscores
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the importance of leaving it to Congress to prescribe the procedures applicable to agency
action. It tends to undermine, in an unhealthy manner. the legitimacy of the political
process of appointing agency officials. Agency officials are appointed by the President to
help bring the President’s program to fruition. The President should be able to appoint
the most close-minded agency officials imaginable if that helps the President carry out
the administration’s program on which the President was elected. Rulemakings are often
preceded by years of information gathering, informal discussions, studies, and thought.
Much of the time, agencies initiate rulemakings knowing precisely where they want the
rulemaking to go. Vermont Yankee clearly validates this practice.
Bias is another matter. Bias exists when the decisionmaker him or herself has
something to gain or lose from the decision, ranging from pure monetary gains or losses
such as the commissions formerly earned by some judges from fines they imposed to less
tangible gains when a judge is related to or friendly with a party or their lawyer. We do
not tolerate bias in formal adjudication. Due process and court rules typically require
recusal when a judge, for example, owns shares in a corporation involved in a case or
when a judge’s relative or friend is a party or lawyer in the case. On the other hand, we
tolerate an enormous amount of bias in the legislative arena. Lawmakers typically vote
on their own salaries, on provisions of tax law that apply to them, and on spending and
regulatory measures that impact directly on their reelection prospects.

indicated that he was absolutely committed to regulating advertising of sugared cereals aimed at children
and that he would vote to impose the strictest rule for which he could get a majority at the commission. In
the most revealing communication he had on the matter, he wrote to the FDA Administrator that “we do
not have to prove the health consequences of sugared cereals. What we have to prove is that there is a
substantial health controversy[.]” What he was saying is that he would act so long as the record would
survive judicial review regardless of whether a preponderance of the evidence on the record actually
supported the agency decision. This does not impress us as the writing of a person with an open mind.

43

This dichotomy exists to a great extent in administrative law. As noted above, the
APA specifies that agency adjudicators are subject to disqualification for bias. The APA
says nothing about disqualification of rulemaking officials for bias. As a constitutional
matter, the Supreme Court has found bias where adjudicators have a direct or indirect
financial interest in the outcome of an agency adjudication,144 but it has not suggested
that bias is a problem in rulemakings. Ethics rules, which have been strengthened in
recent decades, may have something to say about administrators participating in
rulemakings in which they have a financial or other interest, but the law has not identified
bias as a problem in rulemakings that courts should remedy.

D. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

Subject to exceptions for various kinds of rules and subjects, section 553 of the
APA requires agencies to publish “[g]eneral notice of proposed rulemaking” before
adopting a rule. 145 The notice of proposed rulemaking “shall include – (1) a statement of
the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal
authority under which the rule is proposed; and (3) either the terms or substance of the
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proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.” As late as the mid1960s, it was commonplace for notices of proposed rulemaking simply to describe, in
very brief terms, the sorts of issues that the agency was exploring, to call for information,
and to avoid specifying any proposed rule until the rulemaking process was complete. 146
This is entirely consistent with the text of the APA, which requires publication of either
the “terms . . . of the proposed rule” or the “substance of the proposed rule” or “a
description of the subjects and issues involved.”
As anyone can see by flipping through a random copy of the Federal Register,
notices of proposed rulemaking today bear little resemblance to the sparse documents
commonplace before the late 1960s. A typical notice of proposed rulemaking today
contains extensive background on the agency’s activity prior to issuing the notice, a
summary of the evidence in the agency’s possession and what it hopes to acquire during
the rulemaking, and a proposed rule, perhaps in several different variations. The notion
that an agency could issue a notice of proposed rulemaking that simply announces a
general subject and calls for information is unthinkable. 147
Post-1968 caselaw, all emanating from the lower courts, has totally transformed
the meager requirements for notices of proposed rulemaking contained in section 553 into
146
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an elaborate set of legal mandates. First, agencies must disclose in their notices all of the
critical evidence and reasoning that underlies their proposals so that interested parties can
comment fully upon the information in the agency’s possession. 148 As the D.C. Circuit
has explained:
The APA requires an agency to provide notice of a proposed rule, an
opportunity for comment, and a statement of the basis and purpose of the final
rule adopted. These requirements, which serve important purposes of agency
accountability and reasoned decision-making, impose a significant duty on the
agency. Notice of a proposed rule must include sufficient detail on its content and
basis in law and evidence to allow for meaningful and informed comment: “the
Administrative Procedure Act requires the agency to make available to the public,
in a form that allows for meaningful comment, the data the agency used to
develop the proposed rule.” Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 20 F.3d 1177, 1181
(D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525,
530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“An agency commits serious procedural error when it
fails to reveal portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule in time to allow
for meaningful commentary.”); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (proposed rule must provide sufficient information to permit
informed “adversarial critique”). 149
Second, if agencies come across critical new information during the course of the
rulemaking, they may not be able to rely on that information in formulating a rule without
initiating a new notice in which the additional information is subjected to public
comment, though courts are loathe to require “perpetual cycles of new notice and
comment periods” 150 and accordingly will not require new information to be subject to
comment unless it is dramatically and qualitatively different from information available
at the start of the rulemaking. 151 Third, any rule adopted by the agency must be a
“logical outgrowth” of the original proposals in the notice of proposed rulemaking, so
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that any final rule is adequately flagged by the original notice. 152 Thus, “if the final rule
materially alters the issues involved in the rulemaking or . . . ‘substantially departs from
the terms or substance of the proposed rule,’ the notice is inadequate.” 153 This last
requirement essentially forces agencies to put forth a concrete proposal for a rule in the
original notice (so that the final rule can be compared to the original proposal) and
strongly encourages agencies to put forward a menu of concrete proposals in the original
notice (to increase the chances that any final rule will be a logical outgrowth of
something contained in the notice). The overall result is to turn the notice of proposed
rulemaking into something akin to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Notices can easily run tens of tiny-typed pages in the Federal Register and incorporate by
reference hundreds or thousands of pages of supporting documentation.
All three of these court-imposed requirements for notices of proposed rulemaking
seem very hard to square with Vermont Yankee. The most obvious violator is the
requirement that agencies disclose the data and reasoning that led to the promulgation of
a notice of proposed rulemaking in the first place. There is nothing in the bare text of
section 553 that could remotely give rise to such a requirement, making this a violation of
the basic principle of Vermont Yankee that Congress and the agencies, but not the courts,
have the power to decide on proper agency procedures. Some organic statutes
affirmatively require this sort of disclosure, 154 but in the absence of specific statutory or
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regulatory mandates, it is very difficult to see where courts get the legal authority to add
procedural requirements to section 553. Agency disclosure of data may very well be
good policy to facilitate informed public comment, but Vermont Yankee does not allow
courts to impose procedures because they are good policy. For the same reasons, there
does not seem to be any general legal basis, divorced from specific requirements in
specific organic statutes or regulations, for making agencies initiate a new round of notice
and comment when they intend to rely on information discovered after the notice of
proposed rulemaking was filed.
The requirement that final rules be a “logical outgrowth” of the original notice of
proposed rulemaking is a frequent source of litigation and poses a subtler Vermont
Yankee problem than some of the other practices that we have examined. For a notice
requirement of any kind to make sense, there must be something to control the degree of
difference between the proposed rule and the final rule. Otherwise, agencies could hide
their true proposal from public scrutiny by proposing something completely unrelated to
what they intended to promulgate as a final rule. In these circumstances, interested
parties might not have the opportunity to participate in rulemaking proceedings because
they will not know that their interests are at stake, and the agency might lose the value of
potentially informative input. On the other hand, if courts require too strict a connection
between original proposals and final results, agencies will be discouraged from making
substantial changes to the original proposal based on the comments received. Section
553 sets forth procedures for “Rule Making” rather than “Rule Adoption”; it would be
perverse to make it difficult for agencies to learn from a rulemaking proceeding and
adjust its actions on the basis of information and arguments put forward by interested
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parties. The legal standard governing the adequacy of notice must be sensitive to these
concerns.
The language of section 553 gives little guidance on how much change is
appropriate between the proposal and the final rule. Section 553 requires notice of either
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues
involved. The references to the “proposed rule” or the “subjects and issues involved”
does provide some statutory basis for requiring at least a minimal connection between the
agency’s notice and actions; the agency cannot publish some fictional rule that the
agency does not intend to adopt under any circumstances or present one set of subjects
and then adopt rules concerning something that was not really “involved” in the
rulemaking. 155 But section 553 also implicitly requires that the agency consider the
“relevant matter presented” before adopting its final rule. It is implicit in the nature of
this process that the agency is free to decide not to adopt the proposed rule or any rule at
all or to adopt a different method of accomplishing the goals of the proposal that was
suggested by the comments received. Because the statute permits the agency to provide
notice only of the “subjects and issues involved” if the agency so chooses, our view is
that the best understanding is that no new notice and comment is required if the final rule
is within the subjects and issues involved in the proposal, even if the direction of the final
rule is substantially different from the direction suggested by the notice.
This is a much looser standard than the logical outgrowth test that has been
applied by the courts. For example, consider the notice that was found deficient in
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Chocolate Mftrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. Block. 156 The case involved a rule specifying the foods
that could be purchased with WIC Coupons, a form of welfare provided by the
Department of Agriculture to pregnant women and women with small children. The rule
included a preamble discussing issues concerning the fat, salt, and sugar content of foods
and also the list of foods proposed to be covered by the program. The preamble’s
discussion of the sugar issue focused on cereals marketed for children and on sugar in
juice, but the notice also invited comments “in favor of or in objection to the proposed
regulations.” 157
On its face, the notice met both methods of fulfilling section 553’s notice
requirement -- it contained the text of the proposed rule and the subjects (foods allowed
under the WIC program) and issues (nutrition) involved in the rulemaking. Nonetheless,
after flavored milk was removed from the list of allowed foods based on dozens of
comments expressing concern about its sugar content, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the notice was deficient and that in order to remove flavored milk, the
agency should have provided additional notice and opportunity for comment. The court
reasoned that the preamble’s focus on sugar in cereal and juice, coupled with the silent
inclusion of flavored milk in the proposed list of eligible foods, led readers of the notice
to believe that flavored milk’s inclusion on the list was not open to question. In the
court’s words, “neither CMA nor the public in general could have had any indication
from the history of the WIC Program or any other food distribution programs that
flavored milk was not part of the acceptable diet for women and children . . .. [I]t cannot
be said that the ultimate changes in the proposed rule were in character with the original
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scheme or a logical outgrowth of the notice.” 158 Even more forcefully, the court
concluded that the “process was ill-served by the misleading or inadequate notice
concerning the permissibility of chocolate flavored mild in the WIC Program and ‘does
not serve the policy underlying the notice requirement.’ ” 159 The policy that was illserved was the policy in favor of allowing interested parties to comment on proposed
rules. In the court’s view, the Chocolate Manufacturers Association did not have an
opportunity to comment on the proposed rule because it would not have expected that its
product was being considered for deletion from the list.
Because the final rule without flavored milk on the list of approved WIC foods
was still within the same subjects and issues as the notice, the agency did not violate
section 553 by deleting flavored milk without going through a second round of notice and
comment. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ view, the Chocolate Manufacturers had an
adequate opportunity to comment. Anyone whose product appeared on the proposal was
invited by the notice itself to submit comments in favor of retaining their product on the
list. Everyone knew or should have known that there was the possibility that negative
comments could convince the agency to take any product off of the list. There was
nothing whatsoever misleading about the notice, and it was unfair of the Court of
Appeals to characterize the notice as such.
The transformation of the notice requirement is perhaps most clearly illustrated by
the evolution of the “logical outgrowth” test’s verbal formulation in the Chocolate
Manufacturers opinion. Initially, the court explained that other courts have required that
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the final rule is a logical outgrowth “of the notice and comments already given.” 160 Later
in the opinion, the court condemns the rule as not “a logical outgrowth of the notice.” 161
Prior formulations (and current formulations as well) usually state that the final rule must
be a logical outgrowth of the notice and comments. The final rule barring flavored milk
was certainly a logical outgrowth of the notice (putting flavored milk on the list) and the
comments (urging the agency to delete flavored milk). The court had to omit
“comments” from the formulation of the logical outgrowth test to make its analysis even
moderately plausible. It is a vastly different thing to require the final rule to be the
logical outgrowth of the original notice rather than the logical outgrowth of the notice and
the comments received on that notice. Under this formulation, it was impossible for the
agency to remove any foods from the list except perhaps those that were mentioned in the
preamble, because “no” would never be a logical outgrowth of “yes” although you might
wonder why dozens of commentors were so illogical that they thought that the invitation
to comment on the rule as a whole included urging the agency to remove flavored milk
from the list. Applying the logical outgrowth test without reference to the comments
provoked by the original notice dramatically restricts agencies’ abilities to make changes
between notice and rule without providing a second notice and conducting an additional
period of comment. This transforms the logical outgrowth test from a requirement that
agencies stay within the bounds of the notice and comments received to a requirement
that agencies predict, in the initial notice, all of the possible directions in which the
comments may lead.
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Because some standard of connectedness between the notice and final rule is
necessary to enforce the APA’s notice requirement, finding a Vermont Yankee violation
here is a bit trickier than in situations wholly lacking statutory support. Nonetheless, it is
clear that overly strict application of the notice requirement in this fashion is inconsistent
with the text of section 553, the policies underlying that section, and with Vermont
Yankee as well. Section 553 creates a loose, legislative process under which the agency
should be able to adjust its rule in reaction to the comments received. It has become very
time consuming to engage in rulemaking, and the agency should not worry that every
change it makes between the proposal and the final rule is likely to lead to reversal on
judicial review for lack of proper notice. The process can be highly unpredictable,
forcing agencies to grapple with just how much change is allowed before a court will
declare that the final rule is a material alteration and no longer a logical outgrowth of the
proposal. This gives agencies a strong incentive to overproceduralize by issuing, as we
see today, highly detailed proposed rules with voluminous supporting material, and by
conducting additional comment periods whenever a significant change is warranted by
the comments. Raising the cost of making adjustments based on comments gives
agencies an incentive either to ignore the comments, which is contrary to the whole
premise of legislative rulemaking, or to conduct a second round of notice and comment
whenever it wants to make a change, which is contrary to Congress’s intent in
establishing the informal process embodied in section 553, as recognized by the Court in
Vermont Yankee.
Why have courts so dramatically altered the APA’s requirements for notices of
proposed rulemaking? The answer is not difficult to find, and indicates a violation of
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Vermont Yankee’s rejection of the quest for a better record as a basis for ratcheting up
procedural requirements. Hard look review requires courts to make sure that agencies
considered all of the important problems and issues posed by the subject of the
rulemaking, properly acknowledged uncertainty where appropriate, moved plausibly
from premises to conclusions, and took seriously its statutory mandate rather than
pandering to special interests. In order to assess whether the agency carried out this task,
courts must be able to identify the important problems, issues, uncertainties, and premises
and must be able to distinguish plausible reasoning from smokescreens. In an even
moderately complex rulemaking involving the kinds of technical subjects that are now
typical fare, this is a daunting task for generalist judges and their inexperienced law
clerks. Courts have fashioned the procedural devices in informal rulemaking largely to
facilitate the building of a record that will enable the courts to engage in a “thorough,
probing, in-depth” 162 review that is “searching and careful.” 163 The best way for courts
to tell whether agencies are trying to snow them with technical mumbo-jumbo rather than
seriously addressing problems is to have outside parties with substantial expertise
carefully study the agency’s reasoning and data. That process works most effectively if
the agencies must disclose their reasoning and data at the beginning of the rulemaking
process and thereby subject it to public scrutiny. The court-imposed requirements for the
notice of proposed rulemaking are neatly tailored to perform this record-building
function.
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This kind of procedural tailoring in the name of promoting substantive review,
however, is precisely the practice that Vermont Yankee warned against. It may very well
be true that hard look review is most effective when the notice of proposed rulemaking
sets up an adversarial process and each step in the agency’s progress towards a final rule
gets run through a gauntlet of interested parties. This practice may also find support in
more general notions of procedural fairness. A number of organic statutes expressly
adopt this model and specifically require the procedural devices imposed by modern law.
But section 553 of the APA does not, and if Vermont Yankee forbids courts from
imposing procedures on agencies without a legal basis (as it clearly does), courts cannot
refashion the notice of proposed rulemaking to suit their purposes or notions of
procedural fairness. If courts want to engage in hard look review, they will need to do so
within the procedural mechanisms specified by Congress. They cannot force agencies to
make their job easier.

IV

The potential Vermont Yankee violations that we have identified have an
important feature in common: they all apply a judicial model to what Congress conceived
of as a legislative process. The concept of ex parte contacts is a distinctly judicial one,
with the underlying idea being that all parties to an adjudication should be invited to
participate in all stages of the process. By contrast, in a legislative process, there are no
parties as such, and private discussions out of the public view are the norm rather than the
exception. The requirements that a decision-maker maintain an open mind and not have
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an interest in the outcome of a matter are also derived from the ideal of blind justice in
adjudicatory proceedings. Legislators, by contrast, are often elected to pursue a strong
ideological platform, as is the President who appoints like-minded officials to agencies.
In a legislative process, people are generally aware that their interests may be affected,
but they are not entitled to the sort of targeted notice that is required before they can be
subjected to an order in an adjudicatory process.
It should not be surprising that courts on judicial review have imposed concepts
developed in adjudicatory proceedings on the legislative rulemaking process. Judges, of
course, must believe that they have developed a good process in the realm of
adjudication. Vermont Yankee, however, told judges not to import those concepts into the
rulemaking arena. Unless Vermont Yankee is to be one of those “rare opinions in which a
unanimous Supreme Court speaks with little or no authority,” 164 we need a Vermont
Yankee II to drive the point home.
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